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A Response to Professor Fellows
Mark L. Ascher
Though Professor Fellows's words leave me every bit as
unpersuaded as mine have apparently left her, I am content to
go rather quietly on matters of substance.' I do, however, wish
to point out several respects in which Professor Fellows has
misread my essay and unknowingly made my case for me.
The plainest of Professor Fellows's misreadings occurs in a
discussion of a bit of dispositive language she herself has
drafted: "one half of my residuary estate to B if B survives me
and one half to my lineal descendants per stirpes."2 While I
agree with Professor Fellows 3 that her drafting is incompetent,
she gives the clear impression that I would call this language
good drafting.4 I never said that all language that involves a
survival requirement is good drafting. What I said was that
most estate planners do a pretty good job of handling the lapse
issue.5 Obviously, I believe that most competent estate planners would avoid falling into Professor Fellows's trap.
Professor Fellows alone deserves credit for the "attested/unattested intent bifurcation."'6 I want nothing to do
with it.7 She uses this distinction to trivialize my essay so that
1. Another commentator has recently published doubts similar to mine
about the 1990 version of section 2-603(b)(3) governing the effect of words requiring survival on the antilapse statute. See Martin D. Begleiter, Article II of
the Uniform Probate Code and the MalpracticeRevolution, 59 TENN. L. REV.
101, 126-30 (1991).
2. Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of ProbateReform Finding
the Way to Your Will, 77 MINN. L. REv. 659, 677 (1992).
3. Id. at 678.
4. Id.
5. Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform ProbateCode: Older and Better, or
More like the InternalRevenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 651 (1992).
6. Fellows, supra note 2, at 660.
7. Professor Fellows badly misreads my words when she substitutes her
word, "unattested," for my word, "unexpressed." Id. at 666-67. They do not
mean the same thing. Professor Fellows criticizes me for not wanting to effectuate post-execution intentions. She attributes my lack of interest to my adherence to her "attested/unattested intent bifurcation." My objection to postmortem inquiry into post-execution intent is not, however, that such intent is
unattested, but that it probably never existed and, even if it did, the testator
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the reader could dismiss it as the work of a reclusive refugee
from the nineteenth century.8 That refugee, it seems, refuses
to read cases or acknowledge trends that threaten the Statute
of Wills with the contagion of post-mortem inquiry into "unattested intent."9 Yet it is I, not Professor Fellows, who carefully
analyze the late twentieth-century cases the revisers cite in
support of their work.10 My essay is not a defense of the Statute of Wills, as footnote 13 makes clear.,1 I have repeatedly
stated that my primary point is that the revisers' willingness to
move mountains to produce tiny improvements in faithfulness
to the unexpressed intentions of those who hire no one or no
one competent to plan their estates will result in unjustifiable
statutory interference with the wills of those who have hired
competent estate planners.' 2
In explaining why I feel so strongly about allowing estate
planners to speak for their clients unaided 3 or unimpeded 4 by
the legislature, I do have something for which to thank Professor Fellows. She makes my case eloquently. In discussing another of her hypotheticals, Professor Fellows candidly
acknowledges her own inability to determine how the testator
would have wanted a particular issue resolved:
[I]t is difficult for me to determine the proper distribution of the estate without consideration of [first,] the contents of the residuary devise, [second,] the nature of testator's relationship with her nieces,
and [third,] whether she was survived by other close family members
who might be provided for in the residuary devise. Only after consideration of this and perhaps [fourth,] other information can we begin
to draw conclusions about whether the testator would prefer the entire [amount] to pass under the residuary clause rather than having at
least [half] pass to X.15

That kind of indeterminacy-not Professor Fellows's "attested/unattested intent bifurcation"-is my point. Neither
probably never erpressed it to anyone. Ascher, supra note 5, at 641. I do not
believe that the average testator forms any intent about what should happen
to various bequests in light of subsequent events. And even those who do generally do not express that intent to anyone.
8. Fellows, supra note 2, at 680.
9. Id. at 680-81.
10. Ascher, supra note 5, at 647-48 n.29, 652-53 nn.44-45.
11. My acceptance of the 1990 version of section 2-503 should have warned
Professor Fellows off. She clearly has read footnote 13, because she uses my
acceptance of § 2-503 to accuse me of not understanding my own essay. Fellows, supra note 2, at 668.
12. Ascher, supra note 5, at 642, 649, 654, 655, 659.
13. Probably Professor Fellows's word.
14. Certainly my word.
15. Fellows, supra note 2, at 679.
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Professor Fellows, the rest of the revisers, nor any legislature
has access to the individualized client information that is necessary to decide the issues the revisers are so eager to decide on
behalf of all testators. Neither the revisers nor the legislature
has carefully interviewed the testator to determine her intentions. Nor have they sweated over the selection of each word
necessary for the meticulous implementation of those intentions. When a competent estate planner has already performed
these functions, the UPC should not attempt to impose what
the revisers imagine is the "average" testator's intent. The
UPC should gladly give the testator exactly what her estate
planner has asked for on her behalf.
The fact that estate planners are fallible is beside the point.
Any vaguely competent estate planner knows Professor Fellows's first, second, and fourth items. And many estate planners (in conjunction with their clients) are willing to venture
thoughtful speculation about her third item. Thus, even the
vaguely competent estate planner is infinitely better equipped
to determine and effectuate a particular client's intentions than
the most thoughtful legislature, even one that has enacted the
carefully crafted proposal of a panel of distinguished experts.
Despite my willingness to go quietly in the face of Professor Fellows's substantive comments, I must protest her nonsubstantive attacks.
She, not I, developed the scapegoat
"academic/practitioner bifurcation. '16 Most of the "oblique
negative references to academia"'17 she points to are so oblique I
never made the connection. Apparently I have a much higher
opinion of academicians than Professor Fellows does, for I
would never claim, on behalf of our mutual profession, a monopoly on pretentiousness or arrogance; lawyers sometimes
share these characteristics. Lawyers, too, are sometimes wordy
and fail to say clearly what they mean. Lawyers also sometimes feel compelled to deal individually with every conceivable
variation.
The only time my essay enters even the general vicinity of
the scapegoat issue is in characterizing the UPC as "a laboratory for academicians bent on reaching, at any cost, what they
imagine to be the 'correct' result."' 8 Because Professor Fellows
draws so much meaning from this single statement, I want to
clear the air on exactly what I intended in employing it. My
16. Id. at 660.
17. Id. at 661.
18.

Ascher, supra note 5, at 642.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
V 77:683

basic criticism of the 1990 UPC as a whole is that the revisersall of them-may have seriously misjudged its chances for
widespread enactment. 19 After almost twenty-five years, only
fifteen states have adopted the UPC. Until 1990, even I would
have characterized the UPC as mildly reformist. Just how
many states do the revisers think will adopt their much more
reformist version? Some states that adopted the pre-1990 UPC
will certainly shy away from parts or all of the 1990 version. A
century or two from now all of the 1990 UPC may be widely
adopted. But it will not happen any time soon. The probate
reforms of the last several centuries occurred at a much slower
pace. The UPC should not be the shining city on the top of the
hill. It should instead be the best package the revisers justifiably believe is widely adoptable now. It is a "uniform," not an
"ideal," act. To do their jobs well, the revisers must frequently
trade off reformist ideals against political reality, for it is the
ability of a uniform act to become widely adopted that is the
surest measure of its success.
My essay is about the inappropriateness of the revisers' efforts to substitute their words for the carefully selected words
that appear in competently drafted wills. I object, for example,
to the revisers' eagerness to convert "I give my car to Bob" into
"I give my car to Bob if I still own it at my death or, if I do not
still own my car at my death, I give Bob anything with which I
have replaced my car, or, if I have disposed of my car but not
replaced it, I give Bob cash in the amount of the fair market
value of what was once my car, as of the moment of my
death." 20 Such a will contains no reference to replacements
(cars or otherwise) or alternative cash bequests, yet the revisers
are confident that is what the testator's words mean. Professor
Fellows demonstrates the same eagerness to substitute her own
words for the carefully selected words that appear in my essay.
For example, my essay uses words like "less clear," "much
wordier," "pretentious," "arrogance," and "squirm." Professor
Fellows substitutes for these words "pet theories,"2 1 "eggheads
19. This is certainly true of those who promulgated the Uniform Marital
Property Act, for example. After almost a decade, UMPA still has been enacted only in Wisconsin, leading two individuals deeply involved in uniform
law work to conclude that UMPA's future is "bleak." John H. Langbein &
Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 303, 306 (1987).

20.
21.

Ascher, supra note 5, at 649.
Fellows, supra note 2, at 660.
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gone amok, ' 22 "a theory/practice conflict," 23 "abstract
''
ramblings of some isolated and indifferent law professors,"
and so forth, apparently equally confident that is what I mean.
The fact that she is so wide of the mark is the best proof for
which I could have hoped.
Yet Professor Fellows is not satisfied with substituting her
words for mine. On the basis of my supposed adherence to the
"academic/practitioner bifurcation" that she herself has created, she chastises me: "One can disagree with the approach
and policies of the revised UPC without impugning the motives,
judgment, and qualifications of the revisers."
I suppose it is
understandable (but somewhat odd) to say that I have impugned the judgment of the revisers. My essay certainly is critical of aspects of their work. But a fair reading of my essay
does not lead to the conclusion that I have impugned the revisers' motives or qualifications. Academicians are under an obligation to try to push the law in ways they believe to be correct.
Hence, I fail to see how my statement impugns anyone's motives. Nor do I understand how I have impugned anyone's qualifications.
In academia, earnest criticism on matters of
substance is the sincerest form of flattery. I would never have
imagined that my willingness, as a member of the academy, to
take on the work of those with vastly greater experience and
qualifications would have resulted in outright distortions of a
personal nature. Even one who writes sharply, as I sometimes
do, deserves to have his work evaluated on the basis of the
words he himself has chosen, not on the basis of words someone else chooses for him.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 663.
Id.

